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No. 91

Senate

(Legislative day of Friday, June 6, 1975)

The Senate met at 8:30 a.m., on the expiration of the recess, and was called to order by Hon. QUENTIN N. BURDICK, a Senator from the State of North Dakota.

PRAYER

The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Trust in the Lord with all thine heart; and lean not unto thine own understanding. In all they ways acknowledge Him, and He shall direct thy paths.—Proverbs 3: 5, 6.

Our Father God, as Thou hast given us the morning light of this new day so give us also the morning blessing which shall fill the whole day with joy and beauty.

May our burdens be lightened and our judgments be wiser because, Thou art with us. May our relations one with the other in this place be in the spirit of Him who walked among men doing good.

When night comes may we look back upon a day when we have loved Thee and sought first Thy kingdom and that righteousness which exalts a nation.

In the name of Christ, we ask it. Amen.

APPOINTMENT OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will please read a communication to the Senate from the President pro tempore (Mr. EASTLAND).

The legislative clerk read the following letter:

U.S. SENATE,
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,
Washington, D.C., June 11, 1975.

To the Senate:

Being temporarily absent from the Senate of official duties, I appoint Hon. QUENTIN N. BURDICK, a Senator from the State of North Dakota, to perform the duties of the Senate during my absence.

JAMES O. EASTLAND,
President pro tempore.

MR. BURDICK thereupon took the Chair as Acting President pro tempore.

THE JOURNAL

MR. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Journal of the proceedings of Tuesday, June 10, 1975, be approved.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

QUORUM CALL

MR. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

MR. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. WEICKER) is recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

JOINT CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE-LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY

MR. WEICKER. Mr. President, over 10 months ago, along with the distinguished Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), I introduced legislation to establish a joint congressional oversight committee to police the U.S. intelligence-law enforcement community.

Mr. President, that legislation, along with very similar legislation on behalf of other Senators, has actually had hearings before the Senate Government Operations Committee. So it is not a question of introducing anything new. Rather, it is my intention here this morning to urge the Senate to act.

I have heard that it is the present intention—that may be too strong a word, but rather it is being discussed—that such legislation should not be enacted until after the deliberations and the conclusions of the Church committee.

I might add I heard the same comment made when the Rockefeller Commission was established.

It is my purpose this morning to urge that the Senate act now. There is no reason in the world why these two activities cannot go on simultaneously—the fact-finding, which is the responsibility of the Church committee, and the establish-

ment of an Oversight Committee of the Congress—because, indeed, there is not one Member of this body that can assure the American people that the abuses they read about in the Rockefeller report are not going on right now again. I would hope they are not. I suspect they are not. But we can give no guarantee, and we will not be able to give such a guarantee, until we enact effective congressional oversight.

An overwhelming body of evidence has been compiled documenting abuses by the FBI, the CIA, and other intelligence agencies. I think the time has come, in addition to factfinding, to act upon the facts we already have. There is no reason why the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities cannot proceed with its investigation while a permanent committee is established.

In fact, given the time-consuming nature of the legislative process, I might add that were we to actually start the ball rolling on legislation to create an Oversight Committee, we would probably end up at the same point together, with the Church committee having completed its work and with the Oversight Committee actually being the law.

On the other hand, if we wait until the Church committee concludes, then it will be another year after that before anything is put into place.

Therefore, I rise to reiterate my strong belief that the Congress must establish a permanent oversight capability. To delay establishment of such a committee until next March, as some suggest, is totally unacceptable. Unless Congress acts to establish accountability, no amount of factfinding is worth a damn.

For many years, the American intelligence community has taken the Congress for granted; has treated our citizenry more like an audience than as participants in the Government. Congress has a duty to insure accountability of the vast intelligence establishment. Accountability cannot be achieved without meaningful congressional oversight—oversight that has constancy, purpose, and power to control the purse strings of the agencies.

The Congress has the opportunity to act—to exercise leadership. The legislation, which we reintroduced on January 23 of this year, would establish a

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joint committee of 14 members evenly divided between the House and Senate, chosen by the leadership. In order to insure a fresh outlook to these agencies, we would encourage the leadership of both Houses to consider some form of rotating membership.

Most importantly, the joint committee would have the primary authorization and legislative authority over all the activities of: the CIA, FBI, Secret Service, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency, as well as other surveillance activities or operations of other departments.

No longer will the budgets of the CIA or the NSA be submerged in the Defense Department appropriations bill. No longer will the Congress write blanket authorizations for law enforcement/intelligence agencies.

For example, since 1971, the FBI's budget has risen dramatically. In 1971, the FBI's operating budget was \$294 million. In 1975, the Congress appropriated over \$440 million for the FBI. In every fiscal year, the agency got what it asked for—and often more. However, during this same period, there was little congressional scrutiny of the FBI's policies and practices. In fact, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, which have jurisdiction over the FBI, held only 3 days of oversight hearings on the agency. Prior to the impeachment inquiry, neither the House nor the Senate Judiciary Committee held any oversight hearings on the FBI.

Furthermore, this legislation would consolidate the congressional oversight function into one committee with broad powers to demand full accountability.

The present system of fragmented oversight responsibilities—dispersed among four standing committees has proved to be inadequate. The very nature of these intelligence agencies is in direct contradiction to the concept of a free society. Recognizing that fact and that they are also necessary, I submit that we cannot allow the oversight of an intelligence agency to be an ancillary function of a standing committee. Effective oversight of the law enforcement/intelligence community is a full-time job. Too much is at stake to rely on the existing system. Unless Congress effectively exercises its oversight responsibilities, our constitutional democracy is vulnerable to continued subversion.

On December 9 and 10, 1974, the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations held hearings on legislative proposals to strengthen congressional oversight of this Nation's intelligence agencies. Since that time, I have continued to push for expeditious consideration of this pending legislation.

We have scrutinized these proposals in committee. The time to act is now. The facts are on the table. The Rockefeller Commission's findings that the CIA engaged in "plainly unlawful" conduct over its 35-year history simply adds to a massive public record already replete with abuses by these intelligence agencies. The important question is: Faced with this litany of abuses, what will be the congressional response? For our system of checks and balances to work, Congress

as an equal and coordinate branch of government must develop a capability to control the intelligence community.

I am pleased that the Rockefeller Commission has endorsed the recommendation which was set forth by Senator BAKER and myself in the final report of the Watergate Committee. It adds to the growing recognition for the need of some basic improvement in the congressional oversight system.

Mr. President, if we fail to enact this needed reform by the end of this year, it is my firm belief that we will revert to business as usual and future generations will remain unprotected from the nightmare that we know as Watergate.

The nightmare will also present itself in the form of reports relative to the CIA and other law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

I cannot emphasize the point strongly enough that there are really two parts to the legislative oversight function: that of factfinding and that of action relative to the facts discovered. We have been woefully negligent in the latter duty. Everybody wants to move on an investigation in this country, but no one wants to legislate and do the dreary work necessary to make sure that these horror shows do not occur again.

I cannot too strongly urge that we act, that we not wait any longer. Our business is to protect the American people, to protect their privacy and their individual liberties and rights. That is not something that can wait until March of 1976. It should be done in June of 1975. Indeed, it should have been done in June of 1974.

The fact is that the law enforcement and intelligence community has way overstepped its bounds. I know, for instance, the interest that people have shown relative to the raising of a Russian submarine by the CIA. No one questions that type of activity as being necessary. Everyone tends to overlook the larger issue of the involvement of the CIA with our free enterprise system. It is deeply involved with the entire corporate world of the United States of America. That is the type of matter which ought to be of concern to us.

I now yield to my distinguished colleague and good friend, the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), who was probably the first to report the overstepping of the bounds that had occurred, and who, with me, now believes and has believed for a long time that legislative action is just as important as factfinding.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Connecticut for his remarks. I thank him for the opportunity to share this time this morning in the well of the Senate, discussing a matter that has been of great interest to me and to him, which has grown in interest and importance to the people of this country and which I predict will be of even more currency and importance, and will receive greater attention, in the months just ahead.

I especially pay tribute to the Senator from Connecticut for his efforts to do something about the reports of improper activities of intelligence and law enforce-

ment organizations over the last year or so. As he correctly points out, Watergate would mean nothing at all in the context of the entire history of this country if we did not learn from it, if we did not provide against its recurrence, and if we did not profit from our mistakes, from the deeds that have been brought so painfully to the attention of the country. He has been in the vanguard of those who propose legislation, who propose remedies, who proposed that we do more than engage in a preliminary examination of our inadequacies and of our unfortunate past experiences, and this proposal is no exception.

Therefore, it is a great pleasure and indeed my privilege to join with him in a specific proposal to accommodate what we believe to be the requirements of a strong, sound intelligence community on the one hand, and one that is responsible and responsive on the other—a proposal to create a Joint Committee on Intelligence Oversight.

It would be easy enough, as indeed we have in the years past, to say that the CIA belongs, after all, to the executive department, and therefore is uniquely a Presidential asset; that particularly in view of the nature of its undertakings, it is impossible, therefore, to share in a meaningful way responsibility for the operations and workings of the CIA with Congress, or even with the courts, because of the feeling that that sharing might produce leaks, and that, in turn, would destroy the so-called cover of the intelligence operations, and deprive the President of that extraordinary so-called personal asset.

I disagree. I have the privilege of serving on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, a committee which deals with secrets of the highest order and the greatest sensitivity, and which has, since the dawn of the nuclear age, shared with the President the most fundamental tenet of America's credible retaliatory capacity—our nuclear arsenal. I have seen that joint committee function. It is a legislative committee as well as an oversight committee. I have seen it function, and function effectively. I have seen it deal with matters of extraordinary sensitivity. And I have seen it keep secrets. Without exception, there has never been a leak of national security sensitive material from the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

I think that experience negates the proposition that Congress cannot keep a secret. It can keep a secret; and if it can, it must. If Congress sets about the proper structuring of its oversight responsibilities and its legislative organization, it can share with the President the oversight of this important and, I believe, essential national asset, the intelligence capability of the country.

So, Mr. President, I rise today in support of legislation which has experienced approximately 25 years growth and maturity and whose time has surely arrived. As my colleagues may recall, on September 19 of this past year, my distinguished colleague from Connecticut and I introduced S. 4019, a bill to create a Joint Committee on Intelligence Oversight. This legislation, the so-called Baker-

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Weicker bill, was the work of Weicker's and my service on the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. This bill subsequently was re-introduced during this, the 94th Congress, as S. 317 and enjoys the support of 28 Members of the Senate.

My original concern regarding congressional oversight of the Federal intelligence community stems in large part from the investigation of CIA activities conducted by the minority staff of the Senate Watergate Committee. The recommendation of the Watergate Committee that congressional oversight of the intelligence community be strengthened, as well as my own recommendation calling for the creation of a Joint Committee on Intelligence Oversight, were based on the knowledge before the committee and in the public domain in July of 1974. Since that time, the compelling need for rejuvenated congressional oversight has been rendered immediate by more recent disclosures and revelations. It is hardly necessary to recite the troublesome accounts of questionable domestic and foreign operations conducted by the CIA, the FBI, the IRS, the Postal Service, and the military. Currently, we find ourselves confronted by allegations of CIA participation in assassinations of foreign leaders, as well as the oft-discussed instances of substantial CIA domestic activities. Some of these domestic activities have been labeled by the report of the Rockefeller CIA Commission, which was released yesterday, as "plainly unlawful and . . . improper invasions upon the rights of Americans."

I believe that, in view of these recent disclosures, allegations, and reports, the Congress must immediately reassure the people of this country that the American intelligence and law enforcement community is under somebody's control. And I find that this immediate need is best supplied by the speedy enactment of the Joint Committee on Intelligence Oversight Act, as introduced by Senator Weicker and myself.

I am pleased that the need for the creation of a new congressional oversight capability is shared by: First, a substantial number of my colleagues, including the distinguished majority leader, who introduced legislation in 1953, 1954, and 1955, to establish a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence; second, the Rockefeller CIA Commission which recommended to the President that he should urge the Congress to establish "a Joint Committee on Intelligence to assume the oversight role"; third, apparently President Ford in light of his remarks during his Monday news conference; and fourth, a series of witnesses appearing before intelligence oversight hearings conducted by the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, chaired by Senator MUSKIE, during December of last year.

As a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, I am particularly sensitive to the select committee's charge to report to the Senate recommendations to improve executive and legislative control of intelligence and related activities. In view of these recent developments, however, I

Joint Committee on Intelligence is an idea which has fully matured and which requires implementation.

We have become painfully aware of the actual and potential abuses resulting from domestic intelligence gathering, surveillance, political spying, questionable foreign intelligence operations, and the like. I believe that this awareness mandates that Congress, as soon as possible, increase its watchdog capability for domestic surveillance activities, and for foreign intelligence operations. The Rockefeller Commission agrees, the President seemingly agrees, a substantial number of our colleagues agree, former intelligence officials agree, and I believe the public agrees that the Congress must strengthen and regularize its oversight of the intelligence community. Moreover, by the time the Congress completes further hearings and deliberations on this legislation and by the time it passes both Houses and is presented to the President, I believe that it will dovetail nicely with the report and recommendations of the Church committee.

I wish to carefully point out the distinction between this measure and the ongoing inquiry of the Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. A Joint Committee on Intelligence Oversight is a prospective, permanent solution to achieve effective congressional oversight of the several intelligence functions of the Government, and is designed to insure an appropriate balance between the requirements of democracy and the requirements of a sufficient intelligence capability to insure security and national defense. When doubts arise, as they have, regarding the propriety of certain intelligence operations, the Congress, the people's branch of Government, must be privy to those requirements and make an intelligent balancing judgment.

Mr. President, I find that our current oversight arrangement does not meet this function. Thus, I believe that it is time to face up to the almost overwhelming and virtually incontrovertible fact that a new oversight capability is required, and that the Congress must proceed accordingly.

I hope and expect that the appropriate jurisdictional committees will consider carefully the Baker-Weicker proposal, which is modeled on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, in supplying this requirement; and I have great faith that this legislative effort will not follow in the pattern of those 150 intelligence oversight bills that have been introduced previously and have remained unenacted into the law of the United States.

Mr. President, I conclude by once again expressing my admiration to the Senator from Connecticut and my appreciation for his efforts in this respect and for his joining with me in this effort to create legislative oversight and to demonstrate in the creation and exercise of this oversight function that Congress, as a coordinate branch, must share with the White House the responsibility for the oversight function; and in the belief that we have got to get to the bottom of the investigations now under way—to take up the President's mandate and chal-

lenge this investigation, but to do it in a discreet, honorable, and honest way that does not do jeopardy to the CIA or to this country.

I think the important thing for the future is to put in place institutional arrangements to continue legislative oversight for the future. I hope the jurisdictional committees will act promptly on this matter, and will have in place and ready to function a Joint Committee for Intelligence Oversight as soon as the so-called Church committee has completed its work and been discharged from its responsibilities.

Again I thank my colleague for yielding.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an editorial from today's New York Times dealing with this subject.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

"OPERATION CHAOS" ***

Instead of the whitewash that many critics had predicted, the Rockefeller Commission's report on the domestic activities of the Central Intelligence Agency is a trenchant, factual and plain-spoken document. It presents an appalling picture of illegal and improper actions conducted against American citizens in a wide range of activities and over a long period of time.

The National Security Act of 1947 establishing the C.I.A. explicitly forbade the agency from exercising any "police, subpoena, or law-enforcement powers or internal security functions." Although the word "foreign" is nowhere used in the statute, it was clearly understood that the C.I.A. was to engage only in collecting foreign intelligence.

Yet when domestic turmoil began to develop in the mid-sixties in campus demonstrations, rebellions in the black slums and the widespread protest movement against the Vietnam war, the C.I.A. under Richard Helms responded to the pressure from President Johnson to investigate domestic dissidents in the hope of finding embarrassing links to Communist countries.

No such links were ever found, but the White House pressure to pursue this will-o-the-wisp greatly intensified during the first four years of the Nixon Administration. It would be laughable if it were not sinister that the C.I.A.'s code name for this wholly illegal investigative project was "Operation Chaos."

It is horrifying to learn that the C.I.A. had undercover contacts monitor the meetings of groups such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the Washington Urban League. It maintained files on nearly a thousand organizations. By August, 1973, when C.I.A. Director Colby virtually halted this project, "the paper trail left by Operation Chaos included somewhere in the area of 13,000 files on subjects and individuals," the report discloses. Linked to this was a computer system containing an index of over 300,000 names and organizations, almost all of them of United States citizens and organizations unconnected with espionage.

Mr. Helms and the high officials of the Johnson and Nixon Administrations with whom he dealt were well aware that they were breaking the law. Thus, in submitting to Henry Kissinger a report on "Reckless Youth," Mr. Helms wrote in a covering memorandum early in 1969 that a section on American students was "extremely sensitive" because the whole area was outside the agency's charter.

For twenty years beginning in 1953, the C.I.A. surveyed mail between this country and the Soviet Union, opening several thousand letters each year. This, too, was in clear

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violation of the law and was finally halted at the insistence of the Chief Postal Inspector.

Like the Federal Bureau of Investigation under the late J. Edgar Hoover, the C.I.A. in selected instances engaged in wiretapping and burglary—sometimes on its own and sometimes in collaboration with the F.B.I.

What emerges from this report's account of Operation Chaos and of mail interception, wiretapping and other misconduct is the picture of an embryonic police state. The press disclosures that forced this Presidential inquiry by the Rockefeller Commission and the further investigations to come by the Senate and House committee have served to alert the nation to a development profoundly dangerous to constitutional democracy.

CIA REFORM

The revelations in the Rockefeller report demonstrate the unwisdom of freeing the Central Intelligence Agency from all the normal legal and institutional procedures that serve to review and restrain the exercise of power by ordinary government agencies. The law establishing the C.I.A. placed total reliance upon the good judgment of the President and the C.I.A. director.

Even at the outset, in the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations and under the canny leadership of Allen Dulles, this reliance proved insufficient to prevent some illegal activities such as the extensive mail interception program. Under later Presidents this control system totally failed.

The recommendations of the Rockefeller Commission, sound as far as they go, largely add up to imposing the restraints that help control other bureaucracies. It urges that Congress seriously consider making the C.I.A.'s budget "at least to some extent" a matter of public knowledge, instead of concealing it—as is now done—in flimsy items listed in various departmental budgets. Quite apart from all the obvious dangers such loose practice presents, it does not even seem to meet the explicit requirements of the Constitution.

The agency has not only been largely immune from the inquiries of the General Accounting Office, Congress's investigatory arm, but also has felt free to mislead the Office of Management and Budget, the President's agent for fiscal control. Amending the law and executive orders to make it clear that the C.I.A. can no longer escape normal budgetary control, would do much, all by itself, to uncover and perhaps prevent the expenditure of large sums of money on illegal operations.

The C.I.A. has traditionally had an understanding with the Attorney General that the agency would investigate any criminal charges against its own employees and not refer them to the Justice Department. The commission is right to urge that this "gentleman's agreement" be abrogated and that the Justice Department reassume its proper prosecutorial role.

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the Congressional supervisory committees have all failed in their trust. Had they been vigilant and aggressive the shocking misdeeds now being exposed could never have occurred or would soon have been curbed. The commission wisely recommends that the powers of the advisory board be strengthened and that Congress at long last establish a joint committee on intelligence, but not too much reliance can be placed on either of these reforms.

In this dangerous world, the United States must have a well-run agency to gather information about foreign nations, especially those that may have hostile designs. The

excesses and aberrations of the C.I.A. do not erase that necessity, nor do they cancel out the useful work the agency has performed at times in assessing various critical international situations.

The challenge to President Ford and to Congress is to devise institutions and procedures strong enough and supple enough to enable the C.I.A. to perform its essential overseas tasks without simultaneously swirling out of control and becoming a covert menace to the very freedoms it is supposed to be protecting.

*** ASSASSINATION PLOT

The best way to avoid suspicions of a cover-up is not to cover up. President Ford's explanations for withholding those portions of the Rockefeller Commission's report concerning allegations of political assassinations only compound the injury already inflicted by massive leaks and innuendo on this sordid issue.

It is no excuse to say, as the President did, that the subject is "extremely sensitive." Indeed it is, which is why a full and authoritative statement is the only way to prevent half-truths and gossip from acquiring a life and credibility of their own. For the President simply to refer darkly to unspecified incidents of the "past fifteen or twenty years" is in itself a veiled indictment susceptible to misuse for partisan political purposes.

The President personally broadened the Rockefeller Commission's assignment to include the reports of United States involvement through C.I.A. in the ugly business of plotting the murder of foreign rulers. Whatever facts the commission's inquiry established should now be made public, along with whatever additional material emerges from the independent investigations now being made by two Congressional committees.

In the absence of such disclosure, Mr. Ford's statement that "I am totally opposed to political assassination" is more fatuous than reassuring.

ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be a brief period for the conduct of routine morning business, with a time limitation of 3 minutes attached thereto as to individual Members.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

CORRECTION OF THE RECORD

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on page S10304 of the Record for June 10, 1975, at the beginning of the last sentence at the bottom of column 3, I am shown as stating the following, and this is in reference to the possible TV coverage of the Senate's proceedings of the New Hampshire matter:

I did want this to be arranged in such a fashion that it would resemble the House of Representatives during a joint session or joint meeting.

It should read:

I did not want this to be arranged in such a fashion that it would resemble the House of Representatives during a joint session or joint meeting.

I ask unanimous consent that the permanent Record be changed accordingly.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Holton, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGE REFERRED

As in executive session, the Acting President pro tempore (Mr. BURDICK) laid before the Senate a message from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of the Senate proceedings.)

APPROVAL OF A BILL

A message from the President of the United States stated that on June 9, 1975, he had approved and signed the following bill:

S. 1842. An act for the relief of Dr. Arturo Bomolan Dela Rosa.

MESSAGES FROM THE HOUSE

At 11 a.m., a message from the House of Representatives, delivered by Mr. Berry, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House has passed the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 492) making urgent supplemental appropriations for summer youth employment and recreation for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, and for other purposes, in which it requests the concurrence of the Senate.

ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

The message also announced that the Speaker has signed the enrolled bill (S. 441) to amend the Forest Pest Control Act of June 25, 1947.

The enrolled bill was subsequently signed by the Vice President.

COMMUNICATIONS FROM EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, ETC.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. BURDICK) laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

FINAL DETERMINATION OF THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION

A letter from the Chairman of the Indian Claims Commission transmitting, pursuant to law, a report of its final determination in respect to the Indian claim of the Bay Mills Indian Community, *et al. v. the United States* (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Appropriations.

REPORT TO THE PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE BOARD OF TRUSTEES

A letter from the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia transmitting, pursuant to law, the annual report of the Public Defender Service Board of Trustees for fiscal year 1974 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

PROPOSED ACT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

A letter from the Chairman of the Council of the District of Columbia transmitting, pursuant to law, a copy of a proposed act to